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THE RELIGIOUS LAWYER IN A PlLURAlLI§'f 
SOCIETY::: 
Howard Lesnick** 
A 
Tennessee attorney, described as "routinely" practicing before 
the Juvenile Court, inquired of the Supreme Court's Board of 
Professional Responsibility what his obligations were as appointed 
counsel to a minor who had asked the court, pursuant to State law, to 
waive the statutory prohibition of abortion without parental consent.1 
He had apparently been appointed to represent minors in such cir­
cumstances on more than one occasion, but he considered himself "a 
devout Catholic [who] cannot, under any circumstances, advocate a 
point of view ultimately resulting in what he considers to be the loss of 
human life."2 The attorney posed to the Board a half-dozen ques­
tions, of which two are salient to my current subject: "[S]hould the 
appointed counsel advise the minor seeking an abortion about alter­
natives and/or advise her to speak with her parents or legal guardian 
about the potential abortion," and "can the appointed attorney de­
cline to accept the appointment for moral [or] religious ... reasons?"3 
In responding to the first question, the Board noted the obligation 
of counsel to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions. "4 It apparently saw an 
* I dedicate this essay to Tom Shaffer, whose work has placed me (like many 
others) enduringly in his debt 
This essay is a revised version of one presented at a conference on The Re/e�·ance of 
Religion to a Lawyer's Work, held at Fordham University School of Law on June 1-3, 
1997. I have benefited from the responses of Milner Ball, Robert Burt, Teresa 
Stanton Collett, Sherman Cohn, Geoffrey Hazard, Jack Healey, Seth Kreimer, Alice 
Lesnick, Samuel Levine, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Russell Pearce, Jack Sammons, and 
the participants in a session of Georgetown University Law Center's Law and Society 
Workshop. I have drawn here-and-there on portions of a book manuscript of mine, 
Listening for God: Religion and Moral Discernment (forthcoming 1998). 
Unless otherwise noted, scriptural translations are from the New Revised Standard 
Version {1989). Because of the vast number of translations now in print, I have felt 
free to substitute a word or phrase from another version at times. 
** Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. 
1. See Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, 
Formal Op. 96-F-140 {1996} [hereinafter Formal Op. 96-F-140). The Tennessee law in 
question provides: "If ... the minor elects not to seek consent of the parent or legal 
guardian whose consent is required, then the minor may petition, on the minor's own 
behalf, or by next friend, the juvenile court of any county of this state for a waiver of 
the consent requirement .... "Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-10-303(b) (Supp. 1997). 
2. Formal Op. 96-F-140, supra note 1. 
3. Id. The omitted language referred to "malpractice insurance" concerns as an 
additional reason. 
4. Id. Tennessee is a "Code" State, that is, one in which the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility {1969) [hereinafter Model Code), rather than the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct {1983} [hereinafter Model Rules), is in force. How­
ever, the language quoted did not appear in the Model Code, supra, promulgated by 
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unstated "only" in this requirement, for it held that "[i]f the minor is 
truly mature and well-informed enough to go forward and make the 
decision on her own, then counsel's hesitation and advice for the cli­
ent to consult with others could possibly implicate a lack of zealous 
representation under [Model Code Disciplinary Rule] 7-101(A)(4)(a) 
and (c)."5 
Beyond that, the Board looked to the requirement of "undivided 
loyalty" and the admonition that counsel not allow "any other persons 
or entities to regulate, direct, compromise, control or interfere with 
his professional judgment." This principle, the Board reasoned, would 
be "called into question" should counsel "strongly recommend[ ] that 
his client discuss the potential abortion with her parents or with other 
individuals or entities which are known to oppose such a choice."6 
The attorney apparently based his suggestion that he be allowed to 
decline the appointment on the language of the professional code, as­
serting that his "religious beliefs are so compelling that [he] fears his 
own personal interests will subject him to conflicting interests and im­
pair his independent professional judgment." The Board turned this 
aside on the ground that "religious and moral beliefs [even if] clearly 
fervently held," are not the sort of "compelling reasons" that the 
Code or judicial rulings have in mind as a permitted ground for with­
drawal from the representation of a person unable to retain counseU 
Characterizing the claim as one "akin to that of a conscientious objec-
the American Bar Association in 1969, but was nevertheless adopted into the Tennes­
see Code from the Model Rules, supra, Rule 1.4(b ). 
The Board preliminarily observed that, under local law, an appointed attorney 
"represents only the minor," that is, acts as an advocate rather than a guardian. See 
Formal Op. 96-F-140, supra note 1. 
5. Formal Op. 96-F-140, supra note 1. It may be that the Board's language re­
flected the substantive criterion by which a judge is to decide whether to grant the 
waiver. The statute provides that the consent requirement "shall be waived if the 
court finds either that: (1) The minor is mature and well-informed enough to make 
the abortion decision on the minor's own; or (2) the performance of the abortion 
would be in the minor's best interests." Tenn. Code. Ann. § 37-10-304(e) {1996). 
6. Formal Op. 96-F-140, supra note 1. 
7. Id. The Board quoted the second sentence of the Model Code, supra note 4, 
EC 2-29, which in its entirety reads: 
When a lawyer is appointed by a court or requested by a bar association to 
undertake representation of a person unable to obtain counsel, whether for 
financial or other reasons, he should not seek to be excused from undertak­
ing the representation except for compelling reasons. Compelling reasons 
do not include such factors as the repugnance of the subject matter of the 
proceeding, the identity or position of a person involved in the case, the 
belief of the lawyer that the defendant in a criminal proceeding is guilty, or 
the belief of the lawyer regarding the merits of the civil case. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
The cases relied on dealt with attorneys held in contempt for refusing judicial ap­
pointment in criminal cases. According to the Board, they stand substantively for the 
proposition that distaste for the offense charged, like unpopularity of the defendant, 
would not excuse failure to accept appointment. See Formal Op. 96-F-140, supra note 
1. 
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tor," the Board found no constitutional objection. Although it noted 
Tennessee case law giving an attorney that desires relief from an un­
welcome appointment the right to a hearing "to develop an adequate 
record" before the appointing judge, the Board seemed to encourage 
the denial of a claim based on "conflict between the ethical and moral 
beliefs of counsel and those of his client,"8 quoting from an earlier 
Formal Opinion holding that "counsel's moral beliefs and [usual] ethi­
cal standards and duties must yield to the moral beliefs and legal 
rights of the defendant. "9 
The problem is surely not an easy one. Yet, I find every aspect of 
this opinion troubling, and the transaction that gave rise to it-the 
judge's initial decision to make the appointment-no less so. The 
analysis evidences a wooden and impoverished view of the lawyer's 
counseling function, a failing that has, I believe, more connection with 
my topic than might first appear; specifically, it denies, by wholly fail­
ing to see, a spiritual dimension of the counseling relation. More fun­
damentally, it manifests an inhospitability to the "personal" norms of 
individual lawyers that I can most accurately describe as statist. It 
sees the pluralist quality of our society as calling on the lawyer to ac­
commodate his or her religion to the official norms of the legal profes­
sion, rather than the reverse. 
I will argue that such a stance is grievously wrong. Its failing is not 
that it is especially hostile to religiously grounded norms; it regards 
them (like other sincerely and strongly held moral claims) as purely 
personal matters, of no great public import. I believe, on the contrary, 
that a pluralist society should celebrate and make reasonable space 
for the strongly held moral beliefs of its lawyers (and others), in the 
name of the collective and not merely the individual good. In seeking 
to justify this belief, I will focus on, but will not be able to limit myself 
to, those moral claims that are grounded in "religion." 
I need to begin by clarifying what I mean when I speak of a reli­
gious lawyer. I will then address the significance of the fact that he or 
she carries on the profession of law in a pluralist society.10 
8. Formal Op. 96-F-140, supra note 1. 
9. Id. (quoting Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee, Formal Op. 84-F-73 (1984)). 
10. In personal correspondence, Professor Jack Sammons has questioned my \\ill­
ingness to accept the Board's Opinion as an accurate e�:pression of the prevailing 
norms of the profession. Rather than taking issue with the Board on grounds that I 
present as largely external to those norms, he would have preferred that I ex"Piore the 
resources for criticism that exist "within the practice." His article, Rank Strangers ro 
Me: Shaffer and Cochran's Friendship Model of Moral Counseling in rlze Law Office, 
18 U. Ark. Little Rock LJ. 1 (1995}, is a challenging articulation of a broader concep­
tion of "the practice." See especially the concluding sections, id. at 34-67. 
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I. THE RELIGIOUS LAWYER 
Were we to gather in one room a number of those who may be 
thought (by themselves or others) to be religious lawyers, we would 
find ourselves among a company whose diversity would be as broad as 
its commonality. One might approach the question of describing such 
a group by identifying the ways in which they differ or the ways in 
which they are alike. You may know the old line that there are two 
kinds of people in the world: those who think of any question by di­
viding it into two or more parts and those who do not. Whether that 
account goes so far as to question whether the second category really 
exists, examples of "first category" approaches in law abound. In a 
celebrated article, Sandy Levinson has identified five senses in which 
one might be a "Jewish lawyer," all but one of which at least arguably 
manifest religious and not merely ethnic or cultural Judaism;11 Russ 
Pearce promptly added a sixth.12 Joseph Allegretti sees four variant 
ways in which a Christian lawyer might approach his or her engage­
ment with the norms of the professional codes,13 and although they 
mainly reflect differing views of the codes (or the world of law and 
lawyers to which they relate), I believe that they also embody differing 
understandings of Christianity as well. Michael Perry, writing about 
universities rather than the practice of law, identifies-in ways not 
without relevance to law practice-two fundamentally differing appre­
hensions of the significance of a university's being Roman Catholic.14 
I place myself firmly within the second category. Instead of contrib­
uting my own taxonomy of religious lawyers, I will seek here to articu­
late the qualities that I believe virtually all religious perspectives 
share, across as well as within sectarian boundaries. Please under­
stand that I am not seeking to supply a definition of religion.15 My 
11. See Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Con­
struction of Professional Identity, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1577 (1993). 
12. See Russell G. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a Multicultural Society: A Midrash 
on Levinson, 14 Cardozo L. Rev 1613, 1616 (1993). 
13. See Joseph G. Allegretti, The Lawyer's Calling: Christian Faith and Legal 
Practice 7-24 (1996) [hereinafter Allegretti, The Lawyer's Calling]; Joseph Allegretti, 
Christ and the Code: The Dilemma of the Christian Lawyer, 34 Cath. Law. 131 (1988). 
14. See Michael J. Perry, The Idea of a Catholic University, 78 Marq. L. Rev. 325 
(1995); see also Lynn R. Buzzard, Vocation, Work and Calling: A Discipleship Study 
35 (1985) (describing three "rationales or bases .. . for Christians serving in politics or 
law"). 
15. I tend to share Kent Greenawalt's belief that "[n]o specification of essential 
conditions will capture all and only the beliefs, practices, and organizations that are 
regarded as religious in modem culture and should be treated as such under the Con­
stitution." Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 Cal. L. 
Rev. 753, 763 (1984). But even if one could establish that Greenawalt has overstated 
the matter, the effort to make an "if and only if' specification of the qualities that 
make one "religious" is, for reasons given in the text immediately following, simply 
not a useful one for present purposes. 
An "essential conditions" approach seeks to define religion in terms of "either a 
single feature necessary and sufficient, or else a conjunction of simple features (A and 
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objective is to lay a foundation for discerning what the stance of our 
society should be toward religiously grounded priorities in law prac­
tice, and the argument that I will set out to make is more normative 
than doctrinal. My aim in the present section is to describe accurately 
the core qualities that religious lawyers share, in the belief that such a 
description will inform our answer to the question: To what e:x1ent 
should the norms of professional responsibility view hospitably the de­
sire of individual lawyers to carry on their law practice in ways that 
are consonant with their religiously grounded priorities? A response 
to that question is incomplete, however, unless it encompasses the fur­
ther one: To what extent should a lawyer refrain from making prac­
tice decisions that fully implement his or her religiously grounded 
priorities? 
There are, I suggest, three themes \vithin which the qualities that we 
call religious may usefully be described. I will speak of them as obli­
gation, integration, and transcendence. 
A. Obligation 
Robert Cover grounds an essay whose brevity belies its depth and 
influence in this thought: "The basic word of Judaism is obligation • • • •  "16 My experience is that the sentence holds true across a broad 
spectrum of religious traditions. It has often been observed that the 
words, religion and obligation, have a common Latin root, ligare, to 
bind. For many, believers and skeptics alike, religion is the principal 
ground of obligation. Indeed, many would assert, \vith Dostoyevsk.')''s 
Ivan Karamazov, "if there is no God, then everything is permitted,"17 
and, although the differences among and \vithin religions over what is 
and is not permitted are significant, there is agreement that to posit 
"God" is to posit obligation channeling choice. 
The traditional means by which religion has reinforced our \vill to 
do God's will is through the conception of God as Supreme Being, the 
King of the King of Kings, the Unmoved Mover, who constituted mo­
rality by "His Word" and dispenses rewards to the faithful and punish­
ment to the disobedient. This "divine command" view of the relation 
B and C and ... ) that is necessary and sufficient for the application of (the] term." /d. 
at 763 n.46. For Greenawalt's argument against such an approach, see id. at 763-67. 
The anthropologist Clifford Geertz, referring specifically to religion, writes of his 
preference for a "definitional procedure of a more inductive sort." Clifford Geertz, 
Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia 96 (1968). His 
effort is to describe not a "universal property" that has "Cartesian sharpness, but ... a 
system of concepts that can sum up a set of inexact ... yet genuine similarities." /d. at 
96-97. 
16. Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurispmdence of the Social Order, 5 
J.L. & Religion 65, 66 (1987). The quoted sentence ends, "obligation or mitzvah." /d. 
The latter word "literally means commandment but has a general meaning closer to 
'incumbent obligation."' Id. at 65. 
17. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov 789 (Constance Garnett trans., 
Random House 1950) (1880). 
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between divinity and humanity is today tenaciously embraced by seg­
ments of orthodoxy in all branches of the Abrahamic tradition, at the 
same time as it is widely rejected by many who deem themselves be­
lievers, theologians and others. It does not minimize the importance 
of the difference between these approaches to religion to recognize 
that each has power to ground a moral life, and that each does its 
work by generating a sense-albeit a significantly different sense-of 
obligation. 
"If the Lord is my Master, to no man am I a slave." This cry of 
seventeenth century English radicals dramatically expresses the way 
in which fidelity to the commands of the One True Ruler has served to 
embolden those who would resist the tyranny of fellow mortals. 
Through the ages, the immortalized and the unremembered alike have 
found the strength to question the idolatrous insistence of the power­
ful on absolute obedience to them in the idea given voice by Sopho­
cles with a simplicity and eloquence unmatched in 2500 years: 
CREON: But tell me thou-and let thy speech be brief-The edict 
hadst thou heard, which this forbade? 
ANTIGONE: I could not choose but hear what all men heard. 
CREON: And didst thou dare to disobey the law? 
ANTIGONE: Nowise from Zeus, methought, this edict came, Nor 
Justice, that abides among the gods. 
In Hades, who ordained these laws for men.18 
Modern theology, prompted in many cases by feminist insights, has 
done us important service in questioning the traditional conception of 
divine law as an edict from Olympus.19 It in no way minimizes our 
recognition of that service for us to recognize as well the two-edged 
quality of even the most traditional, patriarchal/hierarchical image of 
divinity. Rabbi Nancy Fuchs-Kreimer recounts a powerful 
experience, in reflecting on the continuing, contested use in Jewish 
liturgy of the word, melekh, usually translated as "king" (or, now at 
times, the neuter, "ruler"), in the traditional Jewish blessing said on 
many occasions throughout the day.20 In German, the Hebrew word 
is sometimes translated as fuehrer, which was the title by which 
Adolph Hitler chose to be known, and she tells of a group of German 
Christians who, at great personal cost, responded to the command to 
18. Sophocles, Antigone, in Anthology of Greek Drama 101, 115 (Charles 
Alexander Robinson, Jr. ed., 1963 ) ( 442 B.C.E.). 
!d. 
19. Antigone's response goes on to describe this conception in graphic terms: 
Nor did deem thine edicts of such force 
That they, a mortal's bidding, should o'erride 
Unwritten laws, eternal in the heavens. 
Not of to-day or yesterday are these, 
But live from everlasting . . . .  " 
20. Nancy Fuchs-Kreimer, God as "Fuehrer," Reconstructionism Today, Autumn 
1993, at 13. 
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acknowledge the decrees of der Fuehrer in these words: "We will not 
obey Hitler. We already know who our Fuehrer is. ":n She goes on to 
remind us of a Jewish prayer, the aleinu, which has closed all Je,vish 
services since the fourteenth Century. Its central passage begins (in 
the standard English translation): "We bow the head and bend the 
knee before the King, the King of Kings, the Holy One, Blessed be 
He." The meaning of the prayer has been described in these terms: 
"We worship no earthly power. Only to the only King do we bow and 
kneel, as a sign of ultimate loyalty to Him alone, and awareness of our 
mortality."22 
There is at work here something deeper than simply an 
instrumental means of strengthening the will to act morally by 
positing a supernatural sovereign that trumps worldly incentives to do 
otherwise. The kingship imagery is, I believe, a metaphorical 
portrayal, in readily recognizable strokes, of a profound response to 
the experience of awe and wonder, that sense of the sacred embedded 
in the mundane, that, I will suggest below, is at the heart of the 
religious consciousness. That experience generates an imperative, in 
religious terms a "call" or a "leading" to act, and the language of 
divine sovereignty serves to crystallize that feeling of being impelled, 
to keep its force in place in our consciousness, notwithstanding the 
inevitable ebbing of the immediate e:ll:perience itself. In the 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz' felicitous terms, a "repetitive religious 
experience . .. comes in time to haunt daily life and cast a kind of 
indirect light upon it."23 As we live what Geertz calls our 
"commonsense" lives, subject to all that common sense would tell us 
to do and avoid doing, the haunting recollection of moments when we 
have experienced ourselves as in the presence of God does its work. 
This work, however, is done as well with those whose religious 
consciousness manifests very different pictures of God. Two kinds of 
difference come to mind. One questions the analogy to a \villed act of 
a temporal sovereign with the power and inclination to punish 
disobedience. It views the "command" of God as "the eternal law[,] 
... part of the very being of God, rather than something merely willed 
by Him for arbitrary or contingent reasons."24 On such a view, 
"[e]thical requirements bind the conscience because they are true."25 
21. Id. 
22. Mahzor for Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur: A Prayer Book for the Days of 
Awe 258 (Rabbi Jules Harlow ed., 1978). 
23. Geertz, supra note 15, at 110. 
24. Richard Stith, Images, Spirituality, and Law, 10 J.L. & Religion 33, 43 {1993-
94) (attributing the thought to Saint Thomas Aquinas). 
25. Matthew Berke, A Jewish Appreciation of Catholic Social Teaching, in 
Catholicism, Liberalism, and Communitarianism: The Catholic Intellectual Tradition 
and the Moral Foundations of Democracy 235, 239 (Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds., 
1995) ("[T]he commandments are not regarded here as arbitrary, life-denying 
impositions that are alien to man's real impulses ... . 'In fact, human freedom finds 
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So traditional a believer as C.S. Lewis saw a "preoccupation" with 
reward and punishment as a "corruption" of religion.26 Although he 
indeed spoke of commands, he described them as: 
inexorable, but . . . backed by no "sanctions." God was to be 
obeyed simply because he was God. Long since, ... he had taught 
me how a thing can be revered not for what it can do to us but for 
what it is . . . . If you ask why we should obey God, in the last resort 
the answer is, "I am."27 
Writing of Catholic teaching, Joseph Boyle observes: 
[M]oral norms are not, on the Catholic conception, arbitrary impo­
sitions by God. They are not tests set up to make life difficult, but 
the demands of our own rational natures. According to natural law 
theory, morality is a participation by rational creatures in God's 
providence so that they may guide their lives to what is genuinely 
good. Thus, the reason which provides the basis for moral norms is 
a person's own reason, not something alien or imposed.28 
These formulations certainly preserve the idea of divine law as 
supreme, in that sense ruling over humanity. Yet note the critical role 
of what I will call moral discernment, "a person's own reason," as the 
basis for moral norms. A consciousness that can speak of "the de­
mands of our own rational natures" departs in fundamental ways from 
a command consciousness, which would have difficulty seeing a self­
generated call as a demand. The translator of the Soncino edition of 
the Book of Jeremiah interprets the prophecy that God will put the 
law on the hearts of the people29 in these words: "I will no longer be 
something external to them, but so deeply ingrained in their con­
sciousness as to be part of them."30 Here we have important begin­
nings of a relational approach to obligation in which the human task is 
not merely to obey an external command, but to bring to bear that 
within which makes possible the alignment of human and divine will. 
Jeremiah's prophecy is a reprise of the memorable reassurance of 
Moses himself, that the commandment to "turn to the Lord your God 
its authentic and complete fulfillment precisely in the acceptance of that law."' 
(quoting Pope John Paul II)). 
26. C.S. Lewis, Surprised By Joy: The Shape of My Early Life 231-32 (1955). 
27. Id. at 231. 
28. Joseph Boyle, Duties to Others in Roman Catholic Thought, in Duties to 
Others 73, 84 (Courtney S. Campbell & B. Andrew Lustig eds., 1994) (citations 
omitted). 
!d. 
29. Jeremiah 31:33-34: 
But this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those 
days, says the Lord: I will put my law within them, and I will write it on their 
hearts; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. No longer shall 
they teach one another, or say to each other, "Know the Lord," for they 
shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest .. .. 
30. Jeremiah 31:30 n.32 (Soncino Books of the Bible 1959). 
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with all your heart and with all your soul ... is not too hard, nor is it 
too far away": 
It is not in heaven, that you should say, "Who will go up to 
heaven for us, and get it for us so that we may hear it and observe 
it?" Neither is it beyond the sea, that you should say, "Who will 
cross to the other side of the sea for us, and get it for us so that we 
may hear it and observe it?" No, the word is very near to you; it is 
in your mouth and in your heart for you to observe.31 
In our hearts: The metaphor suggests an even fuller source of "obe­
dience" than either sovereignty outside or reason within. A third, 
more far-reaching variant in the religious tradition eschews a stark 
emphasis on inexorability and rationality in the fulfillment of obliga­
tion, and understands that within us as not sufficiently described as 
reason. Law professor Emily Fowler Hartigan has written of a femi­
nist spirituality that experiences the word of God as "a gentle draw, 
more than a compelling force, an invitation more than a command, . . .  
[an] 'ought' that beckons more deeply than it threatens."32 
The centrality of this strain in the religious tradition is no more 
meaningfully exemplified than in the words of Jesus at Gethsemane: 
"My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass me by. Yet not my will 
but yours.'m Jesus' "submission" was an act of love, reciprocal to the 
love that he experienced. Robert Bolt understood this when he had 
his Sir Thomas More, hearing his daughter's heartfelt appeal, 
"[h]aven't you done as much as God can reasonably want?," respond, 
"it isn't a matter of reason; finally it's a matter of love.''34 In describ­
ing what he means by religious consciousness, Quaker sage Douglas 
Steere has focussed in this manner on the words, "attentiveness" and 
"obedience": 
Without attentiveness in both our private and public worship, 
there can be only a confirmation of the African proverb that says, 
"When God speaks, He does not wake up the sleeper." 
But unless this precious attentiveness is linked to obedience, the 
deeper bond is missing. To come near to God is to change, and 
unless there is obedience, a change of will ... , I have failed the love 
that bid me to join God ... .  35 
The account of Jesus at Gethsemane most powerfully describes the 
"change of will" achieved through reciprocal love, experienced from 
both within and without the human actor. "Distress and anguish over­
whelmed him, and he said to [his disciples], 'My heart is ready to 
31. Deuteronomy 30:12-14. 
32. Emily Fowler Hartigan, The Power of Language Beyond Words: Law as Invita-
tion, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 67, 89 (1991}. 
33. Matthew 26:39. 
34. Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons: A Play in Two Acts 141 (1960). 
35. Douglas V. Steere, Traveling In 23-24 (E. Glenn Hinson cd., 1995). 
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break with grief. Stop here, and stay awake with me."'36 Yet the 
weakness that was an ineradicable aspect of Jesus' humanity loosened 
its power over his actions in the moment that his prayer brought him 
into intimate relation with God. 
There is then a complexity and variousness in the religious bases of 
obligation. The Supreme Court first seriously grappled with this vari­
ousness in two decisions interpreting the Congressional exemption 
from compelled military service of certain conscientious objectors to 
participation in war. The Selective Service Act provision then in force 
defined the "religious training and belief" that would ground consci­
entious exemption from the draft as "an individual's belief in relation 
to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from 
any human relation, but does not include essentially political, socio­
logical, or philosophical views or a purely personal moral code.'737 
Notwithstanding this explicit contrast between an external power that 
is superior to the individual and a "purely personal moral code," the 
Supreme Court declared in United States v. Seeger8 that it is the place 
of belief "in the life of the objector," the binding force of the con­
straint upon the conscience, that is critical; the source of a belief 
within or outside the person was explicitly held irrelevant to its "reli­
gious" quality.39 In Welsh v. United States,40 a plurality of the Justices 
again emphasized the salience of the strength rather than the source 
of a person's moral scruples. It read Seeger to apply to a person's 
"moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong," 
even if they are acquired entirely through secular studies, as long as 
they are held "with the strength of traditional religious convictions.''41 
Four Justices held that beliefs that "function as a religion" in a per­
son's life are "religious," even within the meaning of the specific stat­
ute involved.42 
It is a further question whether one should be deemed acting out of 
a religiously grounded obligation and the actor is (as Seeger and 
Welsh were not) a member of a faith community when the act that he 
or she feels compelled to do (or abstain from doing) is not required 
(or forbidden) by the tenets of that faith. From a highly command-
36. Matthew 26:38. 
37. 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1958). 
38. 380 u.s. 163 (1965). 
39. !d. at 184. 
40. 398 u.s. 333 (1970). 
41. !d. at 340. 
42. !d. The prevailing Justices divided over the question whether the language of 
the statute involved in Seeger and Welsh could be read so broadly. Justice Harlan 
would have characterized the moral beliefs at bar as secularly rather than religiously 
grounded, but concurred in the result on the ground that the Establishment Clause 
forbade Congress from honoring the latter without also accommodating the former. 
Welsh, 398 U.S. at 344-54. See also the brief discussion in Greenawalt, supra note 15, 
at 760. The dissenting Justices shared Harlan's view of the meaning of the statute, but 
would have upheld the constitutionality of it so viewed. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 367-74. 
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oriented view of religion, such beliefs are "optional," and scruples 
based on them, even if not "secular," are "merely personal." Yet, to 
one who thinks of his or her relation with God in a more relational 
way, the boundaries of obligation are not so narrowly drawn. 
The Supreme Court has given ambiguous recognition to this 
broader view of religiously-based obligation in two cases dealing with 
eligibility for unemployment insurance. In Thomas v. Review Board 
of the Indiana Employment Security Division,43 a Jehovah's Witness 
had been employed by a private company in its foundry which made 
sheet steel for industrial uses. When the foundry was closed, the em­
ployer reassigned Thomas to a unit that made turrets for tanks. He 
objected, on the ground that his religion called on him not to work on 
the direct production of weapons. He had consulted a fellow em­
ployee who was also a Witness, who responded that doing such work 
was not "unscriptural." Thomas, however, asserted that he was not 
able to "rest with" this view. When the employer proved unable or 
unwilling to provide alternative acceptable employment, he resigned 
and sought unemployment insurance benefits.44 The specific legal is­
sue implicated (in ways that need not concern us here) the question of 
whether his actions were religiously grounded. 
The Indiana Supreme Court characterized Thomas' decision as "[a] 
personal philosophical choice rather than a religious choice," noting 
his fellow worker's contrary view and the fact that Thomas admittedly 
was struggling \vith his beliefs and found it difficult to articulate pre­
cisely where he would draw the line.45 (Some of the steel he had been 
working to produce doubtlessly found its way into military equip­
ment). In reversing, the Supreme Court was influenced in significant 
part by its view that judges should not decide whether "petitioner or 
his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their 
common faith." As Chief Justice Burger, for the Court, asserted: 
"Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation. The narrow func­
tion of a reviewing court in this context is to determine whether there 
was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated his work be­
cause of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his 
religion. "46 
In Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,41 the 
Supreme Court applied this approach to a claimant who was not a 
member of any church or sect, but refused, simply because he was a 
Christian, to work on Sunday. The Board of Review held him disqual­
ified from unemployment insurance, rejecting his constitutional claim 
43. 450 u.s. 707 (1981). 
44. Id. at 710-11. 
45. Id. at 713, 715 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. 
Div., 391 N.E2d 1127, 1131 (Ind. 1979)). 
46. Id. at 716. 
47. 489 u.s. 829 (1989). 
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in these pertinent words: "When a refusal of work is based on reli­
gious convictions, the refusal must be based upon some tenets or 
dogma . . .  of some church, sect, or denomination, and such a refusal 
based solely on an individual's personal belief is personal and 
non compelling . . . . " 48 
The Supreme Court rejected this characterization, holding that the 
sincerity of the claim, and not its grounding in organizational member­
ship, was the relevant criterion. "Never did we suggest that unless a 
claimant belongs to a sect that forbids what his job requires, his belief, 
however sincere, must be deemed a purely personal preference rather 
than a religious belief," noting that in Thomas "there was disagree­
ment among sect members" as to the permissibility of the practice in 
question. 49 
I believe that the sincerity requirement is the substantive lens 
through which more individualized, even idiosyncratic, claims should 
be examined. 50 The deeper question is that involving a sincere claim­
ant who did belong to a specific recognized denomination but took a 
more far-reaching view of his or her obligation than did the commu­
nity itself. An example would have arisen had the State been able in 
Thomas to produce clear documentation that the Witnesses as a reli­
gious organization had in some manner clearly upheld the permissibil­
ity of work like that which Thomas refused. 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act sought to protect conduct 
that is "a person's exercise of religion." 51 An attempt to limit that 
protection to conduct "compelled" by one's religion was rejected in 
Congress.52 Morever, an important opinion by Judge Posner squarely 
disapproved of suggestions in the language of some opinions that reli­
gious motivation will not suffice for protection, preferring a "more 
generous" approach as "more sensitive to religious feeling." 53 The 
48. /d. at 829-30. 
49. /d. at 833. 
50. Cf State v. Hodges, 695 S.W.2d 171 (Tenn. 1985). Hodges deals with a defend­
ant who claimed religious grounds for appearing in court dressed in fur tied at several 
points along his body but leaving his chest and back naked to the waist, his face and 
chest painted pale green, wearing goggles, and carrying or holding a stuffed snake and 
a human skull. /d. at 171 n.l. The Court held that he was entitled to a hearing on the 
sincerity issue, on which the fact (if it proved to be so) that defendant was "the sole 
adherent" to his claimed religion "may be decisive." /d. at 173. See the discussion of 
the problem of "the radically variant view of a single individual" in Samuel J. Levine, 
Rethinking the Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious Prac­
tice and Belief, 25 Fordham Urb. L.J. 85, 96 & n.53 (1988). 
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a)-(b) (1994). 
52. The story is told in Doug Laycock's article, co-authored with Oliver S. 
Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 209, 230-
34 (1994). 
53. Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996). He went on: 
Many religious practices that clearly are not mandatory, such as praying the 
rosary, in the case of Roman Catholics, or wearing yarmulkes, in the case of 
Orthodox Jews (optional because while Jewish men are required to cover 
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Supreme Court's invalidation of the statute on federalism grounds54 
does not undermine the normative salience of this history. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has taken a more am­
biguous view under a state statute and the Non-Establishment princi­
ple. Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc. 55 involved a Massachusetts 
law prohibiting employer insistence, as a condition of employment, on 
any act that would require an employee to forgo "the practice of his 
creed or religion as required by that creed or religion . . . . "56 Two 
Roman Catholic employees of a greyhound track were disciplined for 
refusing to work on a regularly scheduled Friday evening because it 
was Christmas night. Each party produced an affidavit from a Catho­
lic priest. The defendant's affidavit asserted that the only obligation 
on Christmas is to attend Mass between 4:00 p.m. the previous day 
and 1:00 p.m. on Christmas Day, and the plaintiffs' affidavit suggested 
that there was a general requirement (applicable to any holy day of 
obligation) to "abstain from those labors and business concerns which 
impede the worship to be rendered to God, the joy which is proper to 
the Lord's Day, or the proper relaxation of mind and body, although 
[work was permitted to] support [one's] family or to maintain [a] live­
lihood."57 On that basis, the trial court ruled for the defendants: 
The only requirement the church absolutely imposes upon its fol­
lowers is to attend mass. Plaintiffs were not denied the opportunity 
to attend mass, and therefore, plaintiffs cannot establish that they 
were forced to forgo a practice required by their religion. The fact 
that plaintiffs wished to further observe the Christmas holiday does 
not constitute a religious requirement.58 
The Supreme Judicial Court regarded the statute before it as specif­
ically limiting protection to practices "required by that religion." 
Much like Justice Harlan in Walsh, however, the court, first holding 
that the statute could not bear any broader meaning, went on to de­
clare it unconstitutional. The scruples of employees whose "sincere 
religious beliefs differ from the established dogma of their religion or 
are not accepted as dogma by any religion" must be given equal 
recognition. 59 
I d. 
their heads, the form of the head covering is not prescribed), are important 
to their practitioners, who would consider the denial of them a grave curtail­
ment of their religious liberty. 
54. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. a. 2157 (1997). 
55. 668 N.E.2d 1298 (Mass. 1996). 
56. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1A) (1997). 
57. Pielech, 668 N.E.2d at 1300. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 1301. Moreover, the court reasoned, to require the judiciary "to ascer­
tain the requirements of the religion at issue" violates the prohibition of excessive 
entanglement of courts in religious disputes. Id. at 1303. 
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The court's statutory analysis is curious, but may in part rest on a 
sharp distinction between a requirement and a motivation, however 
strongly felt. Such an approach fits effortlessly with the tendency to 
recognize religious requirements only if experienced in the command 
tradition.60 The temptation to take it, however, surely needs to be 
resisted. "Requirement," and certainly "obligation," should not be so 
cabined. Would we say, for example, that the pacifism of Trappist 
monk Thomas Merton, whose tradition permits participation in a "just 
war," was not a religiously grounded obligation but merely a "per­
sonal choice"?61 
Let me illustrate the point more fully with a powerful recollection. 
How many today remember Martin Niemoller? A German Lutheran 
Pastor imprisoned during the War for anti-Nazi activities, he was, to at 
least one American Jewish teenager, a very bright star in a very dark 
sky. In 1961, now a Bishop, he spoke in Philadelphia, and I went to 
pay my respects as much as to hear him. He had been aU-boat (sub­
marine) commander in the German Navy during the First World War, 
and spoke of how he had subsequently become a pacifist: 
I would watch through the periscope for the enemy vessel, and 
when the crosshairs were amidships of it, I would say, "fire." The 
sailor standing by would press a button, and I would watch the tor­
pedo's wake and the hoped-for explosion. One day, years later, I 
asked myself, if Jesus of Nazareth had been that sailor, when I or­
dered, "fire, " would he have pushed the button? 
60. The statute before the Supreme Judicial Court protected "the practice of his 
creed or religion as required by that creed or religion . . . .  " Id. (quoting Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1A) (1997)). The court either believed that "that creed or reli­
gion" could not be that of the individual claimant, but only that of the institution, or it 
believed that, if the reference were to the individual's creed or religion, it was anoma­
lous to deem the practice in question "required;" the statute did not, after all, refer to 
practices "motivated by" or "grounded in" religion. Both grounds seem curiously 
unnecessary, given that the court saw the constitutionality of the statute at stake, but 
the second-which for our purposes is the more significant-was not given voice in 
any judicial language. 
The ultimate curiosity is that the court, having held the statute unconstitutional 
because it failed to protect plaintiffs, ruled that they therefore could not rely on it at 
all, and dismissed the complaint. There was no discussion of the alternatives follow­
ing a judgment of invalidity because of underinclusiveness. On such an approach, the 
claimants in Seeger and Walsh also would have lost their suits. 
61. The sequel to the Pielech decision, interestingly enough, lends support to a 
broader view of obligation. The Massachusetts legislature, seeking to "restore the 
right of individuals to be free from discrimination in the workplace based on their 
sincerely held religious beliefs," amended the statute to overrule the construction 
given it by the Supreme Judicial Court. The words, "creed or religion," are now de­
fined to include "any sincerely held religious beliefs, without regard to whether such 
beliefs are approved, espoused, prescribed or required by an established church or 
other religious institution or organization." S. 105, 181st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 
1997), available in WL, 1997 MA S.B. 105. The Supreme Judicial Court had held that 
enactment of the Bill would not violate the Establishment Clause. See Opinion of the 
Justices to the House of Representatives, 673 N.E.2d 36 (Mass. 1996). 
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One could hardly say that Niemoller's decision was "personal" 
rather than "religious" in its motivation. But was it "required," or 
only a "choice"? He had commented on an announcement that hap­
pened to be on the blackboard of the room where he spoke, regarding 
a discussion (in those Cold War years) of the subject, "Theism vs. 
Atheism in the Conflict of Nations," and had provocatively told us 
that, in his view, it did not matter whether you were a theist or an 
atheist. Rather, the important question was whether you were a 
Christian. Of course, he then had to tell us what the term meant to 
him: "A Christian," he said, "is one who accepts Jesus as teacher and 
brother." Would anyone conclude, however, that he was not obli­
gated but only chose to give up warfare because he ex-perienced Jesus 
as "only" teacher and brother rather than as Lord, because his retro­
spective experience of the presence of Christ in the submarine was as 
inspiration rather than commander? 
Niemoller's account recalls to me a famous teaching of George Fox, 
the founder of the Religious Society of Friends: "Christ was come to 
teach his people himselfe."62 It is critically important not to allow the 
traditional idea of God as sovereign preempt the field, as it were, con­
fining the notion of obligation within rigid hierarchical concepts and 
equating the idea of obligation with that of compulsion. Conscious­
ness of the divine presence can work to inspire, to enable, as well as to 
overpower. It can set a person free to act, even in the face of the 
gravest danger, and does not operate merely as a counter-threat.63 
B. Integration 
Note the distinction between an obligation to attend a religious ser­
vice, to observe the Sabbath, to refrain from eating meat during Lent 
or pork at any time, or to remove (or wear) one's hat or shoes in the 
sanctuary; and an obligation not to work in the production of weap­
ons, serve in the armed forces, or, to recall the example with which 
this essay began, represent a person seeking to do an illicit (but law­
ful) act. The distinction is not that one sort is more "religious" than 
the other, nor is it meant, I believe, to suggest a distinction between 
ritual and ethics. It is that, far from exhausting the category of the 
religious act, practices of the first sort ordinarily imply the existence of 
those of the second, and are meant to support them. The religious 
tradition rejects the notion-however much it may accurately be re­
flected in the lives of many who regard themselves as religious-that 
its imperatives are satisfied by observance of ritual. Hear again the 
searing words of Amos: 
62. 1 The Journal of George Fox 113 (Norman Penney ed., 1911). 
63. See also the extremely powerful account by another German, Emil Fuchs, 
Christ in Catastrophe (1949), of the way in which his direct experience of the presence 
of Christ in his prison cell enabled him to resist, at great cost, Nazi oppression. 
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I hate, I despise your festivals, and I take no delight in your solemn 
assemblies. Even though you offer me your burnt offerings and 
grain offerings, I will not accept them; and the offerings of well­
being of your fatted animals I will not look upon. Take away from 
me the noise of your songs; I will not listen to the melody of your 
harps. But let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like 
an everfiowing stream. 64 
In the Jewish tradition, with its 613 commandments, their intended 
effect is "not to drain away energies better spent on moral concerns, 
but rather to fabricate a system of life in which restraint, self-disci­
pline, and the tendency to relate every facet of human existence, how­
ever apparently inconsequential, to the will of God become[ s] a 
matter of instinct."65 To that end, the Talmud articulates a "rule" that 
is not satisfied by recitation of prescribed prayers: "Prayer should not 
be recited as if a man were reading a document. . . . If a man makes 
his prayer a fixed task[ ], his prayer is no supplication."66 One should 
pray only when he can "direct his heart."67 
To no realm of life does this principle have greater salience than 
one's work. Islamic scholar Seyyed Hossein Nasr has expressed the 
thought eloquently: 
There is a Hadith [saying of the Prophet] according to which when a 
man works to feed his family he is performing as much an act of 
worship as if he were praying .. . .  
. . . The Shari'ah [revealed law] gives a religious connotation to all 
the acts that are necessary to human life . . . . In this way the whole 
of man's life and activities become religiously meaningful. Were it 
to be otherwise man would be a house divided unto itself, in a con­
dition of inner division and separation which Islam tries to avoid.68 
What Nasr writes of Islam characterizes no less the teaching of 
other branches of the religious tradition. Let me here set forth illus­
trations drawn from several faith traditions. 
The Vietnamese monk Thich Nhat Hanh describes the Buddhist 
principle of "right livelihood": 
Right livelihood implies practicing a profession that harms neither 
nature nor humans, either physically or morally. . . . We live in a 
society where jobs are hard to find and it is difficult to practice right 
livelihood. Still if it happens that our work entails harming life, we 
should try our best to secure new employment. We should not al-
64. Amos 5:21-24. 
65. Ronald M. Green, Religious Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis of Reli­
gious Belief 136 (1978). Green goes on: "If the moral life has, as one of its vital 
preconditions, an integrated, disciplined and attentive self, then one important effect 
of Jewish law, both in its moral and religious dimensions, was to create this kind of 
ordered and sensitive personality." !d. 
66. C.G. Montefiore & H. Loewe, A Rabbinic Anthology 349 (1974). 
67. !d. at 347. 
68. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ideals and Realities of Islam 98 (1966). 
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low ourse lves to drown in forge tfulness . Our vo cat ion can nouri sh 
o ur unders tand ing and com pass ion, or it can erode them. There ­
fore, o ur wor k has mu ch to do w ith our pra ct ice of the Way.69 
To my law school colleague Seth Kreimer, "if Judaism teaches any­
thing, it is that power brings with it responsibility."70 Writing about 
the responsibilities of the Jewish lawyer, he goes on: 
To the Jew who ta kes trad ition ser iou sly, da ily life is r inged w ith 
obl igations . . . . [T]he sen se that moral res pons ib il ity pervades da ily 
life is one wh ich we share as he ir s  of a trad ition wh ich doe s no t 
draw bo undar ies wh ich set rel igious obl igations to one s ide a s  we 
enter se cular l ife . 
As Jew ish lawyers, we cannot a ct in a moral va cuum . At a min i­
m um, we must re co gnize that our profe ss ional a ct s  ha ve moral ly 
fre ighted consequen ces .... [E]very cho ice we ma ke a s  lawyers, in 
will contes ts, d ivor ce pro ceed ings, produ ct s  l iab il ity a ct ion s or pro xy 
fights, has an im pa ct on the lives that are l ived by the vict im s or 
bene ficiar ies of our a ct ions, and the integr ity of the syste m of jus tice 
in wh ich we par ticipate . We cannot cla im ind ifferen ce to those ef ­
fe cts be cause we a ct on behalf of cl ient s. Our ... trad it ion requ ire s 
us to be al ive to the moral d imens ions of the choi ces we ma ke in our 
profess ional lives .71 
Law professor Joseph Allegretti, in a remarkable book subtitled 
Christian Faith and Legal Practice, has described the central challenge 
as "one of balance, of integration": 
[I]f I beg in to bring my rel ig ious values w ith me into the wor kpla ce, 
a cur ious th ing ha p pens . My wor k is pla ced in a w ider, dee per 
frame of mean ing. No longer am I a lawyer who ha p pen s to be a 
Chr istian on Sunday, but a fo lower of Chr ist who is trying to l ive 
o ut my Chr ist ian calling w ith in my role as a la wyer. It is a small 
sh if t, ju st a rearrangement of a few word s, to mo ve from a lawyer 
who is a Christian to a Christian who is a lawyer, but in that smal l 
s hift  a whole new way of loo king at wor k emerges . . . . 72 
So, for example, while Levinson's first model of "the Jewish Law­
yer," what he terms the intersection of sets, or the subset of Jewish 
people who also are lawyers, "carries with it no implications about the 
actual intersection of one's Judaism with one's practice,'m one would 
not term such a person a "religious lawyer," and, whatever implica-
69. Thich Nhat Hanh, Interbeing: Commentaries on the 1iep Hien Precepts 51 
(1987). 
70. Seth Kreimer, The Responsibilities of the Jewish Lawyer 2 (unpublished arti­
cle on file with the author). See also Sam Levine's discussion of his search among the 
writings of the Sages for guidance in finding and carrying on "a career related to more 
internal matters of religion, affecting my moral character and spirituality." Samuel J. 
Levine, The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating Spirituality, Scholarship and 
Profession, 27 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1199, 1203 (1996). 
71. Kreimer, supra note 70, at 2-3. 
72. Allegretti, The Lawyer's Calling, supra note 13, at 126. 
73. Levinson, supra note 11,  at 1586. 
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tions might attend his or her practicing within a "pluralist society," 
they would not be of present interest.74 
It is here, of course, that the area of discord is centered, for the 
concept that I have termed integration regards the "religious lawyer" 
as most essentially described by the adjective, and only contingently 
by the noun, in Allegretti's terms, a Christian who is a lawyer rather 
than a lawyer who is a Christian. Levinson has described this source 
of discord by the evocative metaphor of professional norms as 
"bleaching out" one's religion (along with such other "merely contin­
gent aspects of the self' as race, gender, or ethnic background). The 
objective of the "standard version of the professional project," Levin­
son asserts, is "the creation, by virtue of professional education, of 
almost purely fungible members of the respective professional com­
munity."7 5 The opinion of the Tennessee Board of Professional Re­
sponsibility that opens this essay is characteristic of this stance.76 
Our consciousness of the very different call of the religious tradition 
has been greatly informed by the writing of Professor Thomas Shaffer. 
He has reminded those of us who work within the legal profession 
that the religious tradition stands against any such bleaching out. The 
religious idea of "vocation," Shaffer insists, is not limited to the call to 
take orders. A lawyer, like any other person taking up a work life, is 
"called out of the church, sent out from the particular people, to do 
something that is religiously important."77 The religious lawyer 
"stands in the community of the faithful and looks from there at the 
law. . . . [S]he is first of all a believer and is then a lawyer."78 A 
notion of professionalism that sees the professional as "having been 
removed from his organic community . . .  and transported into an in­
stitution" is a "complex of pretenses" and a "pernicious form of 
corruption. "79 
To Shaffer, I hardly need add, "the church" is not a building, but it 
also is not the institutional Roman Catholic Church or the specific 
priest and congregation with whom he worships.80 It is the commu­
nity of people, the spiritual descendants of the communities of Jewish 
and gentile Christians described in the Book of Acts and the Letters 
of Paul, "where the connection between faith and work is developed, 
74. The subject would be of interest with respect to a society that was both secular 
and anti-semitic. Twentieth-century history does not lack examples. 
75. Levinson, supra note 11, at 1578-79. 
76. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. 
77. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Tension Between Law in America and the Religious 
Tradition, in Law and the Ordering of Our Life Together 28, 45 (Richard John Neu­
haus ed., 1989). 
78. Thomas L. Shaffer & Mary M. Shaffer, American Lawyers and Their Commu­
nities: Ethics in the Legal Profession 198 (1991). For a further discussion, see id. at 
213-17. 
79. Shaffer, supra note 77, at 49. 
80. See Shaffer & Shaffer, supra note 78, at 199. 
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talked about, described truthfully,"81 and "where questions of priority 
and behavior are resolved in discussion," in company with the Holy 
Spirit.82 
To what extent the State-promulgated norms of professional re­
sponsibility should facilitate, to what extent obstruct, a lawyer's desire 
to practice in ways that are "religiously important" is the question of 
Part IT of this essay. It is the aspects of religious consciousness hereto­
fore addressed-obligation and integration-that place the question 
on the agenda of "a pluralist society." 
C. Transcendence 
To describe as "religious" one who feels bound to obey certain 
moral precepts throughout his or her life activities is obviously using 
the term overinclusively, for there are many who can justly claim to 
meet fully the criteria of obligation and integration, yet abjure, even 
spurn, the label-either on philosophical grounds or because of the 
manifold crimes that have been committed in the name of God 
throughout the world and across the centuries.83 Being religious is 
more than living a good life, an integrated life, despite the temptations 
to depart from that path which the world places before us. 
Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, like many others, has described 
the "more" in terms of the holy: "The good is the base, the holy is the 
summit. Things created in six days He considered good, the seventh 
day He made holy."84 To express the "more" of holiness, or sacred­
ness,85 in words is not easy, and much profound teaching, written and 
oral, has been devoted to the effort. The great nineteenth-century 
Christian theologian Rudolf Otto coined the word, numinous, to de­
scribe that "more," associating it \vith the mysterium tremendum-the 
feeling of the presence of an awesome power before which we are 
wholly submerged.86 To the twentieth-century historian of religion, 
Mircea Eliade, the sacred manifests itself as reality, a reality "of a 
wholly different order from 'natural' realities."87 
What, to me, undergirds these conceptions is an openness to awe, 
triggered perhaps by the apprehension of awesome power but also by 
81. Id. 
82. Thomas L. Shaffer, Maybe a Lawyer Can Be a Servant; If Not . . . , rJ Tex. Tech 
L. Rev. 1345, 1350 (1996). 
83. For an understanding discussion of such a reaction, see Merold Westphal, Sus­
picion and Faith: The Religious Uses of Modem Atheism (1993). 
84. Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Sabbath 75 (1966) (published with Abraham 
Joshua Hesche!, The Earth is the Lord's). 
85. The word, holy, is associated in current usage with a judgmental or self-right­
eous piety. The word, sacred, better fits the sense, which I will develop here, of open­
ness to awe. 
86. Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor 
in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational 2-30 (1958). 
87. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion 10 ('.VIl­
lard R 'frask trans., 1959). 
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an "appreciation of the possibility of meaning and moral order,"88 of 
an "overpowering, nonrational appreciation of purity and complete­
ness in the world and purpose and caring in all life. "89 This is the 
stance that Rabbi Heschel felicitously called "radical amazement,"90 
the experience of time as tinged with eternity, finitude with infinity, 
the mundane as embodying the transcendent. It is a stance that has 
been given expression by the rabbis in a wonderful variety of ways. 
The Hasidic sage, Rabbi Nachman of Breslov, enjoined us: "Seek the 
sacred within the ordinary. Seek the remarkable within the common­
place."91 Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik describes holiness as "the ap­
pearance of a mysterious transcendence in the midst of our concrete 
world . ... [It] does not wink at us from 'beyond' like some mysteri­
ous star that sparkles in the distant heavens, but appears in our actual, 
very real lives."92 Similarly, Rabbi Harold Schulweis writes of "mira­
cles" in this vein: 
A miracle is an intimation of an experience of transcending mean­
ing. The sign-miracle does not refer to something beyond or con­
trary to logic or nature. It refers to events and experiences that take 
notice of the extraordinary in the ordinary, the wonder in the every­
day, the marvel in the routine .... 93 
The most prosaic object can be the subject of this awareness. To 
Rabbi Schulweis, "[b]reaking bread is as miraculous as dividing the 
sea."94 Writing about the iconic tradition of Eastern Christianity, law 
professor Richard Stith quotes an eloquent instantiation of this idea: 
What is a nut if not the image of Jesus Christ? The green and fleshy 
sheath is His flesh, His humanity. The wood of the shell is the wood 
of the Cross on which that flesh suffered. But the kernel of the nut 
from which men gain nourishment is His hidden divinity.95 
88. Daniel C. Maguire, The Moral Core of Judaism and Christianity: Reclaiming 
the Revolution 33 (1993). 
89. Samuel H. Weintraub, The Spiritual Ecology of Kashrut, Reconstructionist, 
Wrnter 199111992, at 132, 133. Compare Vanessa Ochs' eloquent personal testimony: 
I knew what the sanctified life was not. Not a life filled with more rituals, 
more scrupulously observed. Not more praying. Not becoming a better per­
son, being more charitable, more concerned with everyone else's pains. 
Sanctifying had something to do with a sense of constant wonder-feeling 
gratitude and finding significance everywhere, in every action, relationship, 
and object. 
Vanessa L. Ochs, Words on Fire: One Woman's Journey into the Sacred 5 (1990). 
90. Abraham Joshua Heschel, Man Is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion ch. 2 
(1951). 
91. Nachman of Breslov, The Empty Chair: Finding Hope and Joy 59 (Moshe 
Mykoff ed., 1994). 
92. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Halakhic Man 46 (Lawrence Kaplan trans., 1983). 
93. Harold M. Schulweis, For Those Who Can't Believe: Overcoming the Obsta­
cles to Faith 56 (1994). 
94. ld. at 61. 
95. Stith, supra note 24, at 42 n.34. 
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A well-known quatrain of William Blake's is as good a rendering of 
the idea in words as I know: 
To see a Wo rld in a Gra in of Sand 
And a Hea ven in a Wild Flower, 
Ho ld Infinity in the pa lm of you r  hand 
and Ete rnity in an hou r.96 
As Blake's words suggest, a sense of the sacred need not be theistic. 
What is essential, however, is that this openness, this experience, not 
be confined to time spent in church, synagogue, or mosque, listening 
to a Beethoven Quartet, or standing before crashing waves or a bril­
liant sunset, but be sought in the moment-to-moment hurly-burly of 
everyday life. In Rabbi Heschel's words, the goal is "to e"-"Perience 
commonplace deeds as spiritual adventures, to feel the hidden love 
and wisdom in all things."97 At any moment, wherever we may be, we 
need only wake, like Jacob, from our dream to realize: "Surely the 
Lord is in this place-and I did not know it!"98 
II. A PLURALIST SociETY 
The normative position that I believe the foregoing section grounds 
is that a pluralist society should whole-heartedly make room for the 
moral constraints under which religious lawyers might be moved to 
act. Far from needing to be "bleached out" by the norms of profes­
sionalism, a lawyer's desire to guide his or her actions by the qualities 
I have described-a sense of obligation to perceived moral impera­
tives, a commitment to the integration of personal and professional 
life, and a sense of transcendence in the world and those who inhabit 
it-should be presumptively welcomed as socially desirable character­
istics, which enhance both the inherent quality and the likely conse­
quences of interactions that lawyers have with clients, third parties, 
and the legal system. A polity that encourages its citizens to bring to 
bear their own serious moral reflections on the morally significant de­
cisions they face will be more likely to grow in justice and humanity.99 
96. William Blake, Auguries of Innocence, in II The Oxford Anthology of English 
Poetry 10, 10 (John Wain ed., 1990). 
97. Abraham Joshua Heschel, God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism 49 
(1955). 
98. Genesis 28:16. 
99. Recall Justice Black's memorable plea that we not, by overriding individual 
perhaps idiosyncratic moral scruples, move closer to becoming an .. orthodox., time­
serving, government-fearing" people. See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 116 {1961) 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
Recall too that I am not making a constitutional argument. For a skeptical analysis 
of some asserted bases of constitutional protection for religiously (and secularly) mo­
tivated claims of "privilege," see Christopher L Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The 
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Con­
duct, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1245, 1254-70 (1994). For their alternative approach, see id. 
at 1282-1311. 
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In finding in its pluralist quality a counsel of restraint in its encounters 
with the varying religious scruples of individual attorneys, society is 
therefore not merely indulging an individual's interests, but recogniz­
ing their "collective value" as well.100 
In an exchange of correspondence, Professor Teresa Stanton Collett 
has challenged me to consider whether pluralism in our society can be 
viewed as something to be celebrated only from a stance of moral 
relativism. If one believes, as she and I both do, that some important 
moral claims have truth value, is not the diversity of pluralism about 
morality rather an unfortunate necessity, which must be accepted in a 
"fallen" world and a free society, but ought not be given powerful 
normative force? 
To me, the problem with objective truth is not its existence, but its 
accessibility to our discernment. There is simply nothing I (or any­
one) can say about Truth, Reality, or God that escapes the limitation 
of being an expression of my (or their) understanding of Truth, Real­
ity, or God.101 One can perhaps attribute this fact to "original sin," as 
Collett would, but in my judgment only in the sense that we are crea­
tures who can only "see through a glass, darkly."102 The term is mis­
applied to the extent that it responds regretfully to the fact that we 
have been created with diverse discernments of the demands of moral 
truth. If my understanding of the truth is necessarily situated and par­
tial, the neighbor or public figure whom I least respect, one to whom I 
least would naturally tum as a source of moral guidance, may in fact, 
in his or her last utterance, have discerned a portion of that truth. 
History confirms the judgment of reason that, especially in a fallen 
world, only a robust commitment to freedom of conscience can save 
us from the rule of grave moral evil, whose link with power enables it 
to masquerade as goodness and truth. 
There is more to be said, however. Individual lawyers also need to 
be counseled by the pluralist quality of our society and the inaccessi­
bility of epistemic certainty. Vis-a-vis their clients, they exercise 
power, quasi-public in nature, and in approaching the place of their 
religious scmples in the lawyer-client interaction, lawyers need to rec­
ognize that their religious principles, although in some instances con­
stitutive of their identities and to them a simple acknowledgement of 
ontological truth, are neither politically normative nor necessarily 
100. Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A 
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 837, 
965-66 (1995). Underkuffier-Freund adduces substantial historical sources designed 
to support this conclusion. See id. at 874-960. 
101. For a clear and persuasive philosophical statement grounding this belief in the 
incapacity of a "transcendent Moral Law (or the like)" to foreclose debate about its 
content, see Jeffrey Stout, Ethics After Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their 
Discontents 21-35 (1988). 
102. 1 Corinthians 13:12. 
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shared by their clients. Pluralism cuts both ways, and the task is for 
neither pole to displace the other. 
A. The Profession's Stance Toward the Religious Lawyer 
Recall that the inquiring attorney was described in the Ethics Opin­
ion as "a devout Catholic [who] cannot, under any circumstances, ad­
vocate a point of view ultimately resulting in what he considers to be 
the loss of human life."103 His objection to being assigned as counsel 
for a minor seeking a judicially authorized abortion was grounded in a 
recognition of personal responsibility for the client's desired outcome, 
a flat refusal to accept the balm, for example, of the principle ex­
pressed in Model Rule 1.2(b ), that his representation would not "con­
stitute an endorsement" of the client's "moral views or activities."104 
Some find in this principle a sufficient basis to permit attorneys to 
deny responsibility, while others do not, but what is the justification 
for a rule imposing the principle on one for whom it rings hollow?105 
The Board's answer seems to reflect a fear of undermining the abil­
ity of judges to require counsel to accept unwelcome appointments, 
especially in criminal cases. In rejecting the attorney's effort to invoke 
the norms of conflict of interest-"his religious beliefs are so compel­
ling that [he] fears his own personal interests will subject him to con­
flicting interests and impair his independent professional judgment"­
the Board relied on the Model Code's Ethical Consideration 2-29, 
which admonishes a lawyer, appointed by a court or asked by a bar 
association to represent a person unable (for whatever reasons) to ob­
tain counsel, not to "seek to be excused . . . except for compelling 
reasons."106 This is an unexceptionable admonition which seems to be 
addressed to the professional conscience of individual lawyers, and as 
such suggests a subjective concept of "compelling." Plainly, what ap­
pears compelling to me will often seem different to you. 
The Model Code's Ethical Consideration 2-29 goes on, however, to 
write an objective and highly abstract specification of the idea: 
Compelling reasons do not include such factors as the repugnance 
of the subject matter of the proceeding, the identity or position of a 
person involved in the case, the belief of the lawyer that the defend-
103. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
104. Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.2(b}. 
105. The literature is vast. For justificatory exemplars, sec Charles Fried, The Law­
yer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Ciielll Relation, 85 Yale LJ. 1060 
(1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Prob­
lem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 613. For skeptical analyses, 
see, for example, David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 50-103 (1988); 
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Mora/ Issues, 5 Human Rights 
1 (1975). Professor Pepper's approach, to one who found it persuasive, would supply 
an answer to the question posed rhetorically in the text. 
106. Model Code, supra note 4, EC 2-29. 
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an t in a c rim ina l  p roceed ing is gu il ty, o r  the be lief of the la wye r 
rega rd ing the me rits of the c ivil ca se .107 
The Board saw in this provision a predicate for its holding that "reli­
gious and moral beliefs, [even if] clearly fervently held," are not the 
sort of compelling reasons that may ground withdrawal. The inquiring 
attorney's basis of objection was deemed like one based on "distaste" 
for the offense charged or the defendant's unpopularity in a criminal 
case. The Board concluded that " [c]ounsel's moral beliefs and usually 
acceptable ethical standards and duties must yield to the moral beliefs 
and legal rights of the defendant."108 
I have no quarrel with the concern of the Board, the courts, and the 
organized bar generally to take a "man the dikes" approach to the 
problem of assisting criminal court judges (in those many jurisdictions 
that lack a minimally adequate defender system) to maintain the 
availability of assigned counsel. To accept personal reasons for unwill­
ingness, given the pervasive inadequacy of compensation and litiga­
tion support for criminal defense work, may well be to step out onto a 
slippery slope, and judges are understandably wary of straying onto 
that first step. But there is no basis for presuming across the board, 
and nothing in the description of this particular Tennessee setting, for 
concluding that the criminal defense analogy should dominate our 
thinking here, especially when that tendency leads to so airy a dismis­
sal of important countervailing values. If such a dismissal is legiti­
mated in this case, where it is not difficult to accept the sincerity and 
strength of the lawyer's aversion, one can only imagine the fate of 
religiously motivated scruples that are less mainstream.109 
It is wise and defensible for our professional norms to admonish 
attorneys that their responsibility is to think carefully and to exercise 
restraint before deciding to place their moral scruples in the way of a 
107. Id. (citations omitted). 
108. Formal Op. 96-F-140, supra note 1. 
109. Indeed, given that the attorney practices "routinely" in the Juvenile Court, and 
had been appointed to represent minors seeking an abortion more than once before, I 
am led to wonder about the motivation of the judge, who presumably knew the law­
yer's religion, for making the appointments. It is possible, but hardly likely, that he 
was doing it out of hostility to the lawyer, or-as we too often boast of doing in Jaw 
school-to teach him the skill (and the joys) of arguing ''the other side." Rather, my 
fear-although based on no evidence at all-is that the appointments reflected the 
judge's antipathy toward the availability of abortion and that he had been appointing 
a similarly inclined lawyer in the hope of discouraging young women from going 
ahead with the petition. Such a course of conduct would not only be a seriously law­
less act of oppression of the petitioner, it would also be an imposition on a conscien­
tious attorney who wished neither to assist a minor to obtain an abortion nor, by 
intruding himself or herself into the minor's life, to misuse an attorney's power over 
her to discourage her from it. Indeed, it is not beyond the bounds of plausible specu­
lation that the inquiry was a means of affording a truly conscientious attorney a way 
out of a moral Hobson's choice. 
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person's access to the legal system and the options that it affords.110 
Indeed, if in a particular case or class of cases, there were a specific 
basis to conclude that no alternative was feasibly available, it might be 
proper for a court to override even a strongly based desire to refuse to 
represent a client on moral grounds. Model Code's Ethical Consider­
ation 2-29 and its application here, however, go much further, and re­
flect an a priori dismissal that I find impossible to justify, exactly 
because of our societal commitment to religious pluralism.111 
None of this in any way requires or suggests endorsement of the 
inquiring attorney's moral stance. Indeed, I deem it important to say 
that I find a serious moral failing in the rigor of the attorney's posi­
tion, refusing "under any circumstances" to assist a woman to obtain 
an abortion allowed by law.l12 The moral obligation to respond, if 
one can, to the compelling need of another has deep religious ground­
ing, and one need not regard abortion as morally unproblematic to 
believe that, in some circumstances, morality might oblige an attorney 
to represent one in urgent need of legal counsel in order to obtain an 
abortion.113 
B. The Religious Lawyer's Stance Toward His or Her Client 
By undertaking, whether happily or otherwise, to represent a client, 
a lawyer accepts responsibilities that go beyond those owed to one 
seeking counsel. A person engaged as client is in the power of his or 
her lawyer, in a way that is not true of one only hoping to be so en­
gaged. Accordingly, one may want the norms of the profession to 
leave attorneys significantly more free to be excused from taking on a 
representation than to decide how to carry it out. 
110. The literature has many excellent expositions of the idea that a rejection of 
complete role-differentiation does not entail a complete effacing of a role-based dis­
tinction between a lawyer's and a client's moral position. For one example, see Ger­
ald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L Rev. 63, 73-
81 (1980). 
111. The ill-fated Religious Freedom Restoration Act sought to prohibit "govern­
ment" from "substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion" unless it meets 
the burden of showing that "application of the burden to the person . . .  is in further­
ance of a compelling governmental interest" 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (1995). (For 
the significance of the italicized phrase to the permissibility of denying exemptions 
from legitimate general obligations, see Laycock & Thomas, supra note 52, at 222). 
"Government" was defined to include any "department, agency, [or] instrumentality" 
of a State or state subdivision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1), and presumably would have 
applied to the professional codes promulgated and enforced by or under the authority 
of a State's highest court 
112. Formal Op. 96-F-140, supra note 1. 
113. The most pertinent proof-text, for me, is Leviticus 19:16: "You shall not stand 
idly by the blood of your neighbor." Id. For a discussion of the significance of this 
passage, see Ben Zion Eliash, To Leave or Not to Leave: The Good Samaritan in 
Jewish Law, 38 St. Louis U. LJ. 619 (1994). The classic application is, of course, 
Jesus' Parable of the Good Samaritan, Luke 10:25-37. 
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A strong version of this distinction would assert that, once counsel 
has signed on to the representation, there should be no room for mod­
ulating its execution in light of his or her religious scruples. One basis 
of such a response is the desire to avoid variousness and unpredict­
ability in what clients find when they consult counsel. Apart from the 
fact that the result can hardly be otherwise, 1 14 a focus on the pluralist 
quality of our society seems singularly oriented toward giving such a 
concern lessened weight. A pluralist society celebrates variousness, 
and the fidelity to personal commitment that makes it real. We are 
diverse in our views about the morality of abortion and state-imposed 
restrictions on abortion, and about the appropriate role of personal 
morality on our working-life choices, no less than in our religious ritu­
als and metaphysical avowals. 
The specific question posed by our inquiring Tennessean was fairly 
modest. He did not suggest that he wanted to advise his client to con­
sider the morality of an abortion. His question was whether he might 
advise her about "alternatives" or to speak with her parents "about 
the potential abortion." The Board found that even those actions 
would be improper. First, the Board said that, "[i]f the minor is truly 
mature and well-informed enough to go forward and make the deci­
sion on her own," it "could possibly implicate a lack of zealous repre­
sentation" for counsel to show "hesitation" or to advise "the client to 
consult with others." Second, the Board held that, for counsel 
"strongly" to recommend that his client discuss the abortion with her 
parents "or with other individuals or entities which are known to op­
pose such a choice" would run afoul of the admonition that counsel 
not allow "any other persons or entities to regulate, direct, compro­
mise, control or interfere with his professional judgment."115 
The predicate of the Board's reference to the client's maturity and 
information was probably the fact that, under the Tennessee law, a 
mature and well-informed minor is legally entitled to the waiver that 
she seeks.1 16 Yet surely the Board would not say that a client who 
meets a lawyer asserting clearly what he or she seeks in the represen­
tation should not be given any other information than-assuming it is 
the case-"the law is clearly on our side, let's go for it." To "repre­
sent" a client allows more to, because it requires more of, an attorney. 
Recall here the wisdom and pertinence of the late Professor Warren 
Lehman's insight: 
The client may say, to take an obvious example, "I want a divorce. " 
That goal of the client is a result, usually of his feeling trapped, hurt, 
and hopeless of any other way of coming to terms with his wife. It is 
not in any profound sense what he wants. If a lawyer could magi-
114. For a careful discussion, see David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 
Harv. L. Rev. 468, 484-96 (1990). 
115. Formal Op. 96-F-140, supra note 1. 
116. See supra note 5. 
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cally return that marriage to a happy state, we should certainly call 
him a fool or worse if he were to bypass that opportunity on the 
ground that the client, having said, "I want a divorce," had defined 
beyond question the scope of the lawyer's obligation . . . .  
. . . We say we want justice when we want love. We say we were 
treated illegally when we hurt. We insist upon our rights when we 
have been snubbed or cut. We want money when we feel impotent. 
We are likely to act most sure of ourselves when most desperately 
we want a simple, human response. If this is true, the lawyer 
presenting himself as an uncritical mirror is not a satisfaction but a 
disappointment. The lawyer is in the deeper sense not then doing 
what the client wants.U7 
Of course, a lawyer must tread very carefully, with great self-re­
straint and respect for the minor's multiply vulnerable state in e::\-plor­
ing options other than that one which has triggered the 
representational encounter. But should the lawyer assume that the 
client knows of, and has soberly set aside, such "alternatives" as do 
exist? A minor may know that her parents will not consent to an 
abortion, or may not want them to know that she is pregnant (whether 
they would consent or not), but must the lawyer not even explore the 
question whether she would prefer it if, with counsel's aid, she were to 
become able to find a way to tum to them? 
Many will answer these questions in the negative, on the specific 
ground that an older, male lawyer who believes strongly that abortion, 
even if legally available, is not a licit moral choice is singularly un­
likely to prove able and willing to carry off the counseling task that I 
envision. This is certainly a tenable response.118 Yet the Board's rea­
soning is abstract and wide-ranging, and reflects a bureaucratic and 
wooden sense of "counseling" and a failure even to inquire whether it 
is possible to avoid the hazard of imposition on the client only by em­
bracing the polar stance of abdicating any real fidelity to a client's full 
desires and priorities. 
Allegretti has spoken critically of the widespread inability of the 
prevalent professional norm "to envision a relationship between law­
yers and clients in which one or the other is not in charge of and domi­
nant over the other. . . . Either the lawyer is in charge of the 
relationship, or the lawyer abdicates personal moral agency and re­
gards himself as the unthinking instrument of the client."119 Lehman's 
insight reminds us that, the more unthinking, the less effective, a law­
yer may become, even as an instrument. The Model Code views the 
lawyer as a "wise counselor, experienced in . . .  put[ting] in workable 
117. Warren Lehman, The PursuiJ of a Client's Interest, 77 l\1ich. L Rev. 1078, 
1080-81 (1979). 
118. Note, though, that it supports the premise of the lawyer's effort to avoid the 
representation altogether. 
119. Allegretti, The Lawyer's Calling, supra note 13, at 41, 45. 
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order the entangled affairs and interests of human beings. "120 
Whether a minor has an abortion or does not, whether she shares with 
her parents the truth about her sexual activity and her pregnancy or 
does not, her affairs will often be entangled. And what she is most in 
need of, in addition to help in obtaining an abortion, might be "wise 
counsel" that might aid her in bringing her life into "workable 
order. "121 
Yet Allegretti's words suggest a further question, which our inquir­
ing Tennessean did not raise: Would it have been improper for him to 
explore with his client the morality of her choice? The Model Code 
seems clearly oriented toward a negative answer.122 It is nevertheless 
surely a challenge to an attorney, presumed to be strongly disapprov­
ing of abortion, to carry out this task in an acceptable manner. We are 
speaking of what Shaffer felicitously terms "the unequal encounter of 
two moral persons."123 Yet, again, there is a critical difference be­
tween an admonition against broaching the subject because of a par­
ticularized judgment of its great risk and unlikely success, and the 
notion that "moral counseling" is inconsistent with "zealous represen­
tation." The challenge to the attorney is to integrate strong convic-
120. Model Code, supra note 4, EC 7-8 n.18. 
121. Aided (as so often I have been) by my daughter's "wise counsel," I acknowl­
edge that the limiting words, "often" and "might be," must be borne in mind. There 
will be cases in which the minor's life is "entangled" and out of "workable order" only 
because she needs judicial approval and counsel's help in obtaining it. Her parents 
may be neglectful or abusive in any of innumerable ways, and it may be a wholly 
mature and fully considered decision to keep them at bay with respect to her sexuality 
and her pregnancy. In such cases, the admonitions in the next paragraph of the text 
about the manner and limits of the lawyer's counseling role are certainly applicable. 
122. Recall the language of Ethical Consideration 7-8: 
A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are 
made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations. A 
lawyer ought to initiate this decision-making process if the client does not do 
so. Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal 
considerations. . . . A lawyer should bring to bear upon this decision-making 
process the fullness of his experience as well as his objective viewpoint. In 
assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a law­
yer to point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally 
just as well as legally permissible. . . . In the final analysis, however, the 
lawyer should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally 
available objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for 
the client and not for himself. 
Model Code, supra note 4, EC 7-8. 
123. Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 319, 
319 (1987) [hereinafter Shaffer, Legal Ethics]. Elsewhere, Shaffer acknowledges the 
risks of "moral imperialism and self-deception," which-even for a lawyer recogniz­
ing their presence and force-reinforce the risk of "imposition." He recognizes the 
danger of overwhelming the integrity of the client, but believes that the risks are 
"worth it." See Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers as Strangers and 
Friends: A Reply to Professor Sammons, U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 69, 83-84 (1995). 
Shaffer's fullest elaboration of the idea of moral discourse-in advocacy as well as 
counseling-is in his book, On Being a Christian and a Lawyer (1981). 
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tion124 with a lively awareness that in a pluralist society even the 
strongest conviction is personal, and that the manner of counseling 
must reflect the realities of a client's vulnerabilities. For a religious 
lawyer simply to "testify" to the strength of his or her convictions 
would be a grievous wrong, for it would fail to address the client as a 
concrete human being and a moral agent.125 The task is to seek to 
engage the client's moral agency, to invite him or her to reflection and 
perhaps to dialogue.126 
Among the multiple difficulties of doing that sensitively is the need 
to remain aware that dialogue ends at the client's option, not at the 
lawyer's success at persuasion, and that genuine dialogue presupposes 
that, as Allegretti puts it: 
Perha ps the lawyer will change. Perha ps the la wye r's mo ral doubts 
will be d is pelled as he l istens to his cl ient tell h is sto ry. Pe rha ps the 
la wyer will come to understand more fully what mot ivates his cl ient , 
a p prec iate and acce pt the cl ient 's ob ject ives , and choose to cont inue 
as the c lient 's com pan ion and la wyer .127 
124. It is important to recognize that we are not dealing here merely with the repre­
sentation of a person who has committed what, in the lawyer's eyes, is a serious 
wrong, but with one who seeks the lawyer's aid in committing such a wrong. As 
Shaffer notes with respect to counseling commercial clients, "the moral issue that is 
raised here has less to do with frustrating retributive justice than with complicity. The 
question is whether a lawyer should lend his assistance to wrong that has yet to oc­
cur." Thomas L. Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Serve rile Guilty?, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 
1021, 1030 {1989). 
125. Jeffrey Stout describes Martin Luther King's mastery in "modulating his usc of 
biblical categories when addressing audiences outside of the black church," so as to 
"invoke religious language, when appropriate, without presupposing a full-fledged 
system of religious belief." Stout, supra note 101, at 331. 
Professor Lynn Buzzard of the Christian Legal Society describes three outlooks for 
"Christians serving in politics or law." Buzzard, supra note 14, at 35. The first, which 
he terms "evangelistic," is "using the profession as beachhead for evangelism ... I d. 
While perhaps harmless when practiced with a strong client, I believe that this mode 
is inappropriate in any case and no more legitimate than energetically soliciting cli­
ents to contribute to the lawyer's favorite charity. "Using" is the right word; it is 
using the client for the attorney's own purposes, and unless tllere is specific ground 
for perceiving an invitation, it is a misuse of the relationship. Practiced with a vulner­
able client, it is a gross abuse of power and tile moral equivalent of an assault and 
battery. 
126. It is a serious failing for a lawyer to regard a true (non-impositional) sharing 
with the client of his or her moral insights as simply an option, to be picked up or not 
at the lawyer's unguided fancy. If honest reflection would prompt the belief tllat the 
task can be undertaken and carried out properly, I regard it as an abdication of re­
sponsibility for a lawyer not to make the attempt. On the source of the failing, see 
infra notes 129-30, 132 and accompanying text. 
127. Allegretti, The Lawyer's Calling, supra note 13, at 46. See also Allegretti's 
comments in Lawyers, Clients and Covenant: A Religious Perspective on Legal Prac­
tice and Ethics, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1101 (1998), and, to like effect, Thomas L. Shaf­
fer, Legal Ethics, supra note 123, at 329 ("[M]oral advice is not good unless it is open 
to influence from the client; he who counsels his sister must be prepared to be coun­
seled in turn. . . . This theology of the client argues against the legal ethics of recti­
tude, which has so often seemed to think of him as no damned good."). 
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Some will, of course, experience this possibility as a reminder that 
Satan is never far away. To me, it seems clear that, unless a lawyer 
can approach moral counseling from the stance I have described, he 
or she may not carry it on with a client at all. That problem supplies a 
client-oriented reason why such a lawyer should have been excused 
from undertaking the representation, but the fact that the lawyer has 
been pressed into reluctant service does not legitimate oppression of 
the client-most especially a minor in the circumstances postulated. 
The client remains a "thou" and not an "it."128 
Ultimately, both poles-the legal system's dismissal of a counseling 
element to the representation, and a lawyer's imposition of his or her 
morality on the client-proceed from a similar narrow conception of 
the relationship between lawyer and client.129 In my view, it is the 
religious tradition that most pertinently illuminates this failing. Rabbi 
Abraham Joshua Hesche! has put the fundamental conditioning 
thought with characteristic power. Contrast with the responses of the 
Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility what its inquiring at­
torney might have learned from these words: 
To mee t a human be ing is a ma jor c ha llenge to m in d  an d hear t. ... 
To mee t a human be ing is an oppor tun ity to sense the image o f  
Go d, the presence o f  Go d. Accor ding to a rabb in ica l in terpre ta tion , 
the Lor d sa id to Moses : "Where ver yo u see the trace o f  man there I 
s tan d be fore yo u . . . .  " 
When engage d in a con versa tion with a person o f  differen t re li­
g io us co mm itmen t I disco ver tha t we disagree in ma tters sacre d to 
us , does the image o f  Go d I face disappear ? Does Go d cease to 
s tan d be fore me ?130 
128. Shaffer, Legal Ethics, supra note 123, quotes Martin Buber, who famously 
originated the "I-Thou" imagery, for the insight that the objective reality of an inter­
action between a professional and a person seeking his or her aid "tragically" traps 
both parties in an unequal relationship. Id. at 319-20. He refers to a remarkable dia­
logue between Buber and the great therapist Carl Rogers, in which Buber insists that, 
no matter how much the doctor (lawyer?) attempts to work "on the same plane" as 
the patient (client?), the former seeks to look at the relationship from both sides, 
while the latter can do so only from his or her own. See Martin Buber, The Knowl­
edge of Man 171-72 {Maurice Friedman & Ronald Gregor Smith trans., 1965). 
Therein lies the "tragic" condition: "Humanity, human will, human understanding, 
are not everything. There is some reality confronting us." Id. at 172. 
129. Jack Sammons has been developing an immensely thought-provoking attempt 
to articulate a very different conception, most fully (so far as I am aware) in his article 
cited above. See Sammons, supra note 10. 
130. Abraham Joshua Hesche!, No Religion Is an Island, in No Religion is an Is­
land: Abraham Joshua Hesche! and Interreligious Dialogue 7-8 (Harold Kasimow & 
Byron L. Sherwin eds., 1991). 
Rodger Kamenetz recounts a beautiful Hasidic account to like effect: 
[B]efore every human being comes a retinue of angels, announcing, "Make 
way for an image of the Holy One, Blessed be He." How rarely do we listen 
for those angels when we encounter another human being. How rarely do 
we see in another human being's eyes an image of everything we hold most 
dear. 
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As Allegretti has written with respect to the attorney-client rela­
tion: Lawyers and clients "form a common moral community in which 
each has responsibilities to the other. Each affirms the other as one 
loved by God, unconditionally, and thus possessing unconditional 
value. Each is answerable to the other."131 
The ways in which lawyer and client are "each answerable to the 
other" varies with the context, in the present case most especially the 
age and multiple vulnerabilities of the client and the fact that the law­
yer has come into her life by order of the court. For both an individ­
ual lawyer and those articulating professional norms, the task of 
structuring, expressing, and carrying out that mutual accountability is 
a most difficult one. It is hardly a response to those difficulties, how­
ever, to sweep the problem aside out of a narrowly bureaucratic con­
ception of the counseling function, and, in the process, to fail to grasp 
the opportunity that engaging \vith the difficulties provides for enrich­
ing the lawyer-client interaction and, with it, the lives of both parties 
to it.132 
C. The Conscientious Scruples of the Non-Religious Lawyer 
How does the foregoing apply to the position of the lawyer whose 
scruples are properly characterized as secular, to the demands of what 
some term conscience in contrast to religion? Even if one abjures, as I 
have done, an "essential conditions" or a "definition-seeking" ap­
proach to the concept of religion, any concept that can be described 
has boundaries.133 The boundary may be fuzzy, more like that be­
tween light and dark than between forenoon and afternoon, but there 
nonetheless lies a space beyond the fuzziness, and plainly in the "secu­
lar" area. Yet it seems obvious, in light of an awareness of the difficul­
ties of distinguishing the religious from the secular, that the line 
between the two, however coherent and justifiable, does not mark a 
Roger Kamenetz, The Jew in the Lotus: A Poet's Rediscovery of Jewish Identity in 
Buddhist India 233 (1994). 
131. Allegretti, The Lawyer's Calling, supra note 13, at 45. 
132. The potential for a genuinely relational counseling process (including its moral 
dinlension) is impaired, in my judgment, by the culture of both law schools and law 
practice, in particular their obsessive focus on rights, obligations, and hierarchy of 
decisional authority, which leads to an insufficient attention to the process of interne­
lion between lawyer and client. For a useful discussion of the need for "structures 
that create dialogue," see Mark Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Professional Con­
duct: Lawyer-Client Decision Makbzg and the Role of Rules in Stmcturing the Lawyer­
Client Dialogue, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 1003, 1013. In my view, even clinical 
education, although emphasizing the counseling function, excessively tends to think of 
it  as an exchange of information. Warren Lehman's essay, supra note 117, is a useful 
corrective. 
133. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. For some additional attempts to 
give content to the term, see Judge Arlin Adams' influential concurring opinion in 
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 200-15 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Eisgruber & Sager, 
supra note 99, at 1291-97; and the brief summary of several others in Michael S. 
Ariens & Robert A. Destro, Religious Liberty in a Pluralistic Society 984 (1996). 
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fundamental qualitative divide for purposes of shaping the norms of 
professional responsibility. 
I have spoken of obligation, integration, and transcendence as the 
constituent qualities of a religious outlook. Much secular thinking 
partakes substantially of these qualities. For example, Professor Rod­
ney Smith, seeking to define "conscience," which he means to go be­
yond "religion," turns to terms-an "impartial accuser" and a "pull 
toward rectitude" -that he finds helpful exactly because they "con­
note[ ] a sense of duty or obligation, as opposed to mere[ ] preference 
or choice."134 Integration, too, is not a quality limited to religious ex­
pressions; the same "pull" that seems to compel from within likewise 
works against a compartmentalization of the ethical to "private" life. 
I believe that it is the element of transcendence, the experience of 
awe, of the presence of the infinite, that most fully distinguishes the 
religious from the secular world. At a relatively abstract philosophical 
level, this dichotomy is plainly visible. The religious tradition regards 
an abiding openness to awe, to mystery, as a fundamental truth about 
reality, as an aspect of reality that is to be celebrated and embraced, 
not in place of clarity and transparency but along with them. A reli­
gious consciousness deems it important to ground our stance toward 
the world in a palpable sense of wonder. A secular morality tends to 
place more store by rationality as a guide to moral truth, and tends to 
view a significant dose of "radical amazement" as getting in the way of 
clear thinking. The secularist abides not in wonder but in doubt, wary 
of the attempt to integrate mystery into our efforts to understand the 
world. Mystery tends to be regarded as a problem to be overcome if 
possible, and the conclusion that it is not possible as a confession of 
weakness or defeat.135 
134. Rodney K. Smith, Converting the Religious Equality Amendment into a Statute 
with a Little "Conscience," 1996 BYU L. Rev. 645, 678. Eisgruber & Sager, supra 
note 99, at 1268-69, articulate the meaning of "conscience" as a pull "toward doing 
the right thing." 
135. The Christian theologian Sandra Schneiders describes the world view she 
terms "rationalism" in these terms: 
the boundless confidence in the capacity of the human mind to know every­
thing by means of the . . .  scientific method, . . .  the repudiation of mystery as 
a meaningful category, the justification of whatever destruction is necessary 
to extract the secrets of nature, . . .  and the reduction of reality to what can 
be scientifically investigated . . .  . 
Sandra M. Schneiders, Contemporary Religious Life: Death or Transformation?, 46 
Cross Currents 510, 522 (1996-97). 
The African-American Christian philosopher Cornel West writes critically of ethi­
cal traditions whose "preoccupation" with "improving the social circumstances under 
which people pursue love, revel in friendship, and confront death" has led them to be 
"silent about the existential meaning of death, suffering, love, and friendship." Cornel 
West, The Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought xxvii-xxviii (1991). "Social theory 
is not the same as existential wisdom,'' he maintains, and it is the existential issue that 
to West is critical. Id. As Richard Rubenstein observes, a "purely secular society": 
lacks a sense of the tragic. It has yet to know what even the most archaic 
religions comprehended: that all human projects are destined to falter and 
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It is important to recognize that there is nothing inherent in secular­
ism, in particular in the rejection of theistic approaches, that requires 
the reduction of wonder to clarity, and even as a portrayal of secular 
philosophical stances, the foregoing picture may be overdrawn. A 
secular consciousness that hospitably incorporates a sense of awe and 
wonder has much in common with a similarly oriented religious con­
sciousness. I have in mind in particular those who live their lives with 
a palpable awareness of the miraculous in ordinary family and other 
relationships marked by love and caring, of the need for humility and 
patience in day-to-day life, or of the recurrent and une::..-plainable 
availability of reservoirs of those qualities.136 
Beyond that, individuals have a complexity that resists neat classifi­
cation. To which side of the divide, for example, shall we assign phi­
losopher-classicist (now law professor) Martha Nussbaum? She 
speaks of "reverence and awe" for the norms of the moral law as 
means of committing ourselves to them, as means of deeming them 
obligations: "We picture them as if they stood outside of us, even 
though in a sense we are well aware that they stand within us. "137 She 
is moved by Kant's description of the "ever-increasing awe" with 
which he experiences "the starry sky above me and the moral law 
within me!' It is not that the moral law "is external;" she reads Kant 
to deny that explicitly. Rather, "he regards its presence in himself 
with the same awe with which he views the heavens." To Nussbaum, 
by language of transcendence we "express our wish to be bound" by 
the moral law, "even when we \vish to do otherwise. "138 I find the 
terms, secular and religious, both insufficient to capture her stance.139 
More fundamentally, it should be borne in mind that my effort has 
not been to define religion so much as to describe the qualities that 
characterize religious consciousness, as a predicate for considering 
what the stance of a pluralist society should be toward one whose re-
fail. For technical society, failure is an incident to be overcome by further 
effort facilitated by the replacement of older units of manpower with newer 
units. For the human person, failure is of the very essence. 
Richard L. Rubenstein, After Auschwitz: History, Theology, and Contemporary Ju­
daism 27 (2d ed. 1992). 
136. I owe my recognition here of this variety of transcendence to Alice Lesnick. 
137. Martha C. Nussbaum, Valuing Values: A Case for Reasoned Commitment, 6 
Yale J.L. & Human. 197, 212 (1994) (emphasis added). 
138. Id. 
139. Compare this with the justly famous essay by philosopher-mathematician Ber­
trand Russell, A Free Man's Worship, in Selected Papers of Bertrand Russell 1 (1927). 
Although its richness defies selective quotation, even a brief portion suggests its inte­
gration of deep religious skepticism and a pervading sense of awe. Our "true free­
dom," to Russell, lies in our "determination to worship only the God created by our 
own love of the good, to respect only the heaven which inspires the insight of our best 
moments." ld. at 6. He continues: "[F]or Man, condemned to-day to lose his dearest, 
to-morrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere 
yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day; . . .  to worship at the 
shrine that his own hands have built." Id. at 14. 
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fusal to obey particular norms is grounded in his or her religion. For 
such purposes, it seems obvious that the line between the religious 
and the secular cannot serve to mark off sharply protected from un­
protected scruples. Speaking of the more specifically doctrinal realm, 
Chris Eisgruber and Larry Sager aptly observe that it is "inappropri­
ate for the judiciary to parse among claimants on the basis of their 
metaphysics."140 As one moves further onto plainly secular ground, 
the problems of determining sincerity and importance increase, and 
there probably needs to be a "shading off" toward lessened or wholly 
withheld protection. The subject has attracted recent scholarly atten­
tion, but it seems premature to attempt here to work the problem 
more fully through here as it applies to lawyers.141 
CoNCLUSION 
Although I have found it useful to use the question of aiding a mi­
nor to obtain an abortion as the context for examining the interaction 
between a religious lawyer and a pluralist society, it would be a seri­
ous evasion of the problem to forget how uncommon a context that is. 
Let me tum, one last time, to Shaffer, who quickly provides some 
soberingly reorienting examples of the problem closer to its core: 
The commercial employer . . .  who needs lawyers to help him figure 
out how to pay less than the minimum wage, or how to avoid his 
employees' legal right to organize and bargain collectively-have a 
union-and not get caught at it; or who, having evaded the law on 
wages or unions, wants to avoid punishment. The polluter who has 
undoubtedly polluted but who would like his lawyer to show him 
how to hold the public authorities at bay until he can make another 
year or two of profit . . . . 142 
140. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 99, at 1292. It is worth noting that this view has 
substantial constitutional support. See, for example, Justice Harlan's concurring opin­
ion in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970). As Kent Greenawalt observes: 
"It can be asserted both that the Free Exercise Clause demands an exemption for one 
class of persons and that the Establishment Clause then requires its extension to an­
other class . . . .  " Kent Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All: The Defeat of Selective 
Conscientious Objection, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 31, 43. 
141. Acknowledging that "[e]fforts to create a definition of 'conscience' that is suf­
ficiently restrictive to be viable and, at the same time, capable of protecting actual 
matters of conscience are challenging," Smith, supra note 134, at 681, Professor Smith 
takes up the challenge, presenting a case for protecting non-religious scruples that 
seeks to give the concept discernible contours, id. at 669-86. His discussion describes 
and responds to some skeptical academic analyses of the question by Michael McCon­
nell and Jesse Choper among others. 
142. Shaffer, supra note 124, at 1030. Shaffer also uses the example of a corporate 
executive rather than a lawyer: 
The Jaw directs the corporate manager to an immoral course of action. She 
is called ["out of the church"] to be a trustee for those whose labor has 
produced the wealth she manages. Some of these are employees, some cus­
tomers; some live in the communities where the business operates, and some 
have invested their money in the business. A trustee is faithful to all of her 
beneficiaries. To prefer one and neglect the others is to betray her trust. 
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It is in such cases that Shaffer defines the moral problem Gust as 
our inquiring Tennessean did) not as defending the guilty but as "com­
plicity."143 A lawyer's religion may speak to his or her participation in 
such matters as plainly as the question of aiding in abortion does to 
many Catholic lawyers. Examples abound, but I find special salience 
in the breadth and power of the lesson that Seth Kreimer (speaking to 
a group of Jewish law students) drew from the biblical story of Esther: 
Esther, in part through her own virtues, in part through luck, found 
herself in a position of great potential power. You as law students, 
in part through your own virtues, and in part through luck, likewise 
find yourselves in positions of great potential power. For make no 
mistake, lawyers are in many ways the royalty of American society: 
Upon your graduation, you will be in a position to hold lives and 
fortunes in your hands. And, whichever road you take, to corporate 
law, to public service, to domestic relations there will come a time 
when an opportunity will present itself, at some sacrifice or risk to 
yourself to use your power to mend the world. 
At that time, you might wish to say to yourself what was said to 
Esther: "Who knows whether you were not brought into royal es­
tate for just such a time as this?"144 
Over two centuries ago, Jonathan Mayhew described people as not 
only "naturally endowed with faculties proper for the discerning of 
these differences" between right and wrong, but as "under [an] obliga­
tion to exert these faculties."145 Yet the norms of the profession raise 
what Julian Wright felicitously terms the lawyer's "adversarial shield" 
to wall off the teaching of one's faith tradition.146 A palpable, yet rel­
atively rare harm is in those cases where an individual lawyer, like our 
inquiring Tennessean, finds the shield too porous to do its work. 
More serious, in my judgment, are those countless cases in which law­
yers and law students-for the process is grievously powerful from the 
earliest days of a student's legal education-have been successfully 
socialized, whether happily or reluctantly, not to look past the shield. 
A pluralist society, committed to valuing freedom of conscience, 
should lower the shield. It should not stand between a person and her 
God. 
Shaffer, supra note 77, at 46-47. 
143. See supra note 124. 
144. Kreimer, supra note 70, at 11. The quoted passage is Esther 4:14, by which 
Mordecai persuades Esther to seek, at great personal risk, the King's ear, "to make 
supplication to him and entreat him for her people," Esther 4:8, threatened by Ha­
man's genocidal intentions. 
145. See Underkuffier-Freund, supra note 100, at 895 (quoting Mayhew). 
146. See Julian H. Wright, Jr., Beware of the Adversarial Shield: Possible Roles for 
Christian Ethics in Legal Ethics, 23 Memphis S. L Rev. 573, 574-78 ( 1993). 
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